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ABSTRACT
The principles of management and disposal of highly radioactive
wastes contained in spent fuel from nuclear power generation are
described. The status of developments in spent fuel reprocessing, high-
level waste solidification and geologic isolation is reviewed. Some
generic studies on the possible range of annual radiological doses to
individuals from waste repositories are discussed and compared with
doses from some existing nuclear power and fuel cycle operations, and
with the dose received annually from an average background of naturally
occurring radiation.
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BACKGROUND TO THE JOINT STUDY
Policies adopted by other countries on the ultimate disposal of
high-level radioactive wastes and spent nuclear fuel are important to
Australia because they are relevant to Australia's uranium marketing
policy, and to the possible future introduction of nuclear power to
Australia. From the viewpoint of public reassurance, it is also impor-
tant to be able to demonstrate that the disposal of radioactive wastes
overseas is being undertaken in a responsible and effective manner.
Burial in deep geologic formations is considered to be the most effec-
tive means of ensuring long-term isolation of these materials from the
environment.
A major source of up-to-date information on progress being made
overseas in the ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes is the Radio-
active Waste Management Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA). The
Committee set up in 1975 a Coordinating Group for Geologic Disposal
which initiated collaborative programs to identify deep, stable geo-
logic formations considered to be technically satisfactory for the
burial of highly radioactive wastes arising from the operation of nuclear
power stations. In addition, there is collaborative work in individual
countries between bodies with expert knowledge of radioactive wastes,
geology and hydrogeology. For example, the US Department of Energy
(USDOE) is collaborating with the US Geological Survey and the UK Atomic
Energy Authority (UKAEA) is working with the UK Institute of Geological
Sciences.
Informal contacts between officers of the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission (AAEC) and the Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and
Geophysics (BMR) had shown that BMR has an interest in the geological
aspects of radioactive waste disposal and has appropriate engineering
and hydrogeological expertise. In 1979, the AAEC proposed a collaborative
technical assessment with BMR of developments overseas of various
methods for the treatment and disposal of high-level wastes and spent
fuel from generation of nuclear power. The AAEC agreed to assess
developments in radioactive waste treatment and disposal by member
countries of OECD-NEA, as well as developments in Australian research into
such advanced waste forms as SYNROC. The Bureau, in collaboration with
the AAEC, agreed to assess the relative merits of a variety of types of
(iv)
geologic formations being considered for the immobilisation of the
various waste forms over a range of repository conditions of tempera-
ture, pressure, presence of water, etc. These assessments would take
into account the data being acquired by OECD-NBA.
A tiiuescale of about two years, ending in April 1992, was con-
sidered realistic for the study.
1. INTRODUCTION
A modern 1250 MWe pressurised light water reactor (LWR), capable of
supplying the electrical needs of over 1 million people, discharges each
year 73 spent fuel assemblies. This fuel contains about 32 t of uranium,
1.15 t of fission products, about 28b kg of plutonium, and about 50 kg
of other transuranium elements. A boiling water reactor (BWR) of similar
size discharges 220 fuel assemblies containing about 20 per cent more
uranium and 10 per cent more plutonium [Croff and Alexander, 1980].
Spent fuel is intensely radioactive, hence it is temporarily stored
under water at the reactor sites, the water providing radiation shield-
ing and removing heat from fission product decay in the spent fuel. The
spontaneous heat generation rate in freshly discharged fuel is about 2 MW
t~1 of contained uranium, falling to 10 kw t"* after one year's storage,
and to 1 kW t~* after ten years.
Spent fuel may be managed by reprocessing, a technique in which
residual uranium and plutonium are extracted for re-use in nuclear fuel
cycles, and fission products and other transuranic elements constituting
the high-level waste are converted into a solid form for burial in deep,
stable geologic formations. Alternatively, the unreprocessed spent fuel
may be placed in long-term retrievable storage, or it may be encapsu-
lated and consigned to geologic disposal. The AAEC forecasts of nuclear
power growth suggest that, by -i_he year 2000, about 60 000 tonnes of
uranium in spent fuel may have been committed for reprocessing in
Europe and Japan, and that a further 55 000 tonnes produced in the USA
will have required reprocessing, long-term storage or geologic disposal.
This report reviews the status of overseas developments in manage-
ment and disposal of the high-level radioactive waste arising from the
generation of nuclear power.
2. STATUS OF SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING
In the USA, reprocessing of spent fuel from commercial nuclear
power generation was deferred indefinitely in 1977 as an initiative to
reduce risks from the misuse of plutonium; however, it received quali-
fied political approval in 1981. Reprocessing is taking place in Western
Europe, Japan and the USSR, where plutonium-fuelled fast breeder reactor
(FBR) programs are well advanced, and also in India where a 50 MW experi-
mental FBR is under construction. Reprocessing and plutonium recycle
are vital parts of the breeder fuel cycle. Rapin [1980] has reviewed
reprocessing operations in France, Japan, the UK and the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG). Reprocessing policy and development in the FRG have
been discussed by Scheuten and Salander [1981].
The nationally preferred options under consideration for the repro-
cessing and disposal of spent fuel are listed in Table 1. Of 22 countries
with operational nuclear power stations above 30 MW, six are currently
reprocessing domestic fuel, nine h:.ve contracts for international repro-
cessing services, and th:. e are considering geologic burial of unrepro-
cessed spent fuel [AAEC, 1980]. The status of national programs for
fuel reprocessing is summarised in Table 2.
For some reprocessing contracts negotiated before 1980, it has been
reported that the French and UK reprocessors have agreed to dispose of
the resultant high-level waste; for contracts signed from 1980 onwards,
the reprocessors have the option of returning waste to the countries of
origin [Paige et al., 1980]. Some COMECON countries, which have their
spent fuel reprocessed in the USSR, are apparently not expecting high-
level waste to be returned [Dlouby et al., 1980; Mitzinger, 1979].
3. HIGH-LEVEL WASTE SOLUTION
Light water reactor fuel may generally be reprocessed after a
storage period varying from 1 year [Hill and Lawson, 1980] up to 10
years [KBS, 1978a] to permit some decay of fission product radioacti-
vity. Some spent fuel in the US has been stored for about 20 years.
Reprocessing of the fuel discharged yearly from a 1250 MWe LWR gives
rise to about 40 m3 of high-level waste concentrate. This is a solution
of nitric acid which contains about 0.5 per cent original uranium and
plutonium, together with about 99 per cent of other actinide elements
and fission products other than rare gases and iodine present in the
spent fuel. The fission products consist of isotopes of 42 elements
representing every group of the Periodic Table, from lithium (Atomic No.
= 3) to ytterbium (Atomic No. = 70); 33 of these elements are present
as radioactive isotopes. The actinide and transuranic elements present
range from actinium (Atomic No. = 89) to californium (Atomic No. = 98).
The solution spontaneously generates heat at a rate between 1 and 10 kW
nf 3, depending on the storage time of the fuel before reprocessing.
Concentrated high-level waste solutions from commercial nuclear
fuel reprocessing have been stored in stainless steel tanks in Belgium,
France, India, Japan, UK, USA, and USSR for periods up to 25 years, and
no leakages have been reported from these storage tanks. The tanks
require cooling to remove fission product heat and secondary containment
to prevent leakages. Spare tanks are needed to enable the transfer of
solution in the event of tank failure, and the plant needs constant
supervision. Storage of high-level waste solution is an interim measure
before solidification of the waste into a stable, practically insoluble
glass or ceramic form suitable for disposal, e.g. by deep burial in
geologic formations.
4. SOLIDIFICATION OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
The solidification of high-level waste solutions involves evapora-
tion of nitric acid and water, calcination of residual nitrates of
fission products and actinides into oxides, and conversion of the oxides
into a stable waste form. Candidate waste forms include variants of
glass, ceramics, and also multi-barrier matrix waste forms in which the
high-level wastes are encapsulated in metal, glass or ceramic matrixes
(Table 3). Several engineering alternatives have been developed for the
evaporation and calcination operations, and for fusing, casting or
pressing the waste forms. These operations must be carried out and
maintained remotely owing to the high level of radioactivity of the
wastes. Solidification of high-level waste from the annual reprocessing
of fuel from a 1250 MWe LWR could give rise to about 27 cylinders of
borosilicate glass, each cylinder being 30 cm diameter x 3 m height.
The optimum solid high-level waste form should include the following
characteristics:
the ability to incorporate more than 52 fission products and
actinide elements at a high proportion in the solidified
product;
radiation stability;
thermal stability;
low leachability and high resistance to groundwater attack;
production at low temperatures to retain volatile elements;
and
production technology compatible with remote operation under
highly radioactive conditions.
The ideal waste form with all of the desirable characteristics has
yet to be demonstrated; however, many solid forms are likely to be
satisfactory in an appropriately engineered disposal system. The con-
version of wastes into borosilicate glasses (vitrification) has received
most developmental effort, and is in operation on an industrial scale
for wastes from low burn-up fuel from gas-graphite nuclear power reac-
tors. The technology has been demonstrated on an engineering scale for
wastes from high burn-up fuel from light water reactors [INFCE, 1980].
Glass is considered to be adequate for a first demonstration system of
solidification, transportation and ultimate disposal [USNRC, 1979], but
second generation waste forms now under development have overall char-
acteristics which may prove to be superior.
5. STATUS OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE VITRIFICATION
Table 4 summarises some national achievements, developments, and
plans for the solidification of high-level waste. ™ost nations with
nuclecir power programs have selected borosilicate glass as the principal
form for immobilising their high-level waste.
France is the world leader in applied vitrification technology.
Following small-scale research between 1958 and 1963, 480 PBg (13 MCi)
of radioactive waste from reprocessed gas-graphite (GGR) fuel was
solidified in the PIVER pilot plant at Marcoule into 12 t of borosilicate
glass between 1969 and 1973. A continuous industrial scale vitrifica-
tion plant, Atelier Vitrification Marcoule (AVM), commenced operation in
1978. The AVM plant technology and performance have been described by
Bonniaud et al. [1980]; it has demonstrated an annual capacity for the
vitrification of 132 m3 of fission product solution into 60 t of glass.
This capacity is equivalent to vitrification of wastes from about 3400 t
U y~1 of GGR fuel which is greater than the rate of spent fuel arising
from the French GGR program. The AVM plant is expected to vitrify the
backlog of high-level wastes stored at Marcoule since 1958, as well as
handle the routine production of the Marcoule reprocessing plant. By
April 1982, 440 m3 of high level liquid containing 3.7 EBq (72 MCi) of
radioactive waste had been vitrified into 650 canisters [Chotin et al.,
1982], each holding about 340 kg of glass.
The waste canisters are stored at Marcoule in concrete cells.
Fission product decay heat is removed by forced air cooling; it is
intended to cool the cells by natural convection after several years of
storage. Maximum temperatures of the glass product are maintained below
600°C to avoid spontaneous crystallisation of the glass, a process known
as devitrification.
A similar plant, Atelier Vitrification Hague (AVH), is being
designed to vitrify high-level wastes from 800 t U y~ * of reprocessed
LWR fuel at the Cap La Hague site. This capacity is equivalent to the
generation of about 26 GWe of nuclear power.
The plant will require two processing lines similar to that of AVM,
each consisting of a liquid waste calciner and melting furnace. It has
a planned total capability for the production of 300 t y~ * of glass from
600 m3 y" * of waste solution at an operating level of 250 days per year
[Bonniaud et al., 1980].
By comparison, developments in waste solidification during the past
20 years in Canada, India, the FRG, the UK, the USA and the USSR (Table
4) have been on a laboratory or pilot plant scale. Engineering scale
vitrification of commercial high-level waste in the US has been reported
by Bonner et al. [1980]. French vitrification technology is being
marketed internationally; the UK has abandoned its FINGAL/HARVEST
process and announced that AVM technology under licence is to be used in
a vitrification plant to be constructed at Windscale. Belgium and the
FRG are reported to have contracted for access to AVM technology for
possible application at the former Eurochemic reprocessing site at Mol
and at the Karlsruhe reprocessing plant, respectively [CEA-Cogema,
1981].
The industrial commitment to the French vitrification technology is
illustrated in Figure 1. Reprocessing commitments by France and the
UK to the mid 1990s include contracts for reprocessing 9150 t U from
spent LWR fuel from other countries, and 10 850 t U from domestic fuel
[CEA-Cogema, 1981; Jones and Pearce, 1981]. High-level wastes from
reprocessing 20 000 t U, equivalent to about 660 GWe y of installed
nuclear power, will therefore be immobilised in borosilicate glass;
this is equivalent to vitrification of wastes from four years of the
present installed nuclear power program for the whole world (155 GWe in
1982).
An alternative vitrification process, developed by the FRG, is
under construction at Mol for demonstration on a technical-industrial
scale. This process, named PAMELA, is intended to incorporate waste
from former reprocessing operations into borosilicate glass beads
embedded in a lead matrix, or into blocks of borosilicate glass.
6. DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED WASTE FORMS
Mineral-like crystalline ceramics have been under development at
Pennsylvania State University for almost 10 years. These are refractory
waste forms in which the fispio.n products and actinide elements are
immobilised in the crystal lattices [McCarthy and Roy, 1981]. Unlike
glasses, crystalline waste forms are thermodynamically stable, although
they are more susceptible to radiation damage. The work is aimed at
the development of a form with outstanding chemical durability which
alone could minimise releases of radionuclides, even under the worst
conceivable case of repository failure.
The relative merits and disadvantages of the alternative forms for
immobilising commercial high-level wastes have been extensively reviewed
[Mendel et al., 1981; CEC, 1981; IAEA, 1980; USDOE, 1980b; Wald et
al., 1980; USNRC, 1979]. SYNROC is an alternative ceramic waste form
which has been ranked high in research potential, particularly for salt-
bearing US defence wastes [USDOE, 1980b]. However, it has recently been
reported that defence wastes at the Savannah River Plant are to be immo-
bilised in borosilicate glass [Nucleonics Week, 1982] on grounds of
process simplicity and cost. SYNROC could be an alternative technology
for immobilising wastes from commercial reprocessing in the US if the
latter operation is recommenced; it has not attracted major interest in
Europe owing to the industrial lead established by vitrification tech-
nology.
7. SYNROC
The SYNROC formulation, proposed by Professor A.E. Ringwood of the
Australian National University (ANU), is being developed in a collabor-
ative program between ANU and the AAEC. Ringwood [1978, 1980a] identi-
fied three refractory and leach-resistant minerals occurring in nature -
zirconolite (CaZrTi20y), perovskite (CaTiOs) and hollandite (BaA^TigOjg)
- which have demonstrated stability for millions of years in a wide
range of geologic and geochemical environments. When combined, these
minerals are capable of accepting most of the high-level radioactive
waste constituents into their crystal lattices.
Leach rates of alkali (Cs) and alkaline-earth (Sr) elements from
non-radioactive SYNROC at 300°C into water which was replaced daily have
been up to 1000 times lower than those from borosilicate glass,- under
static conditions, where water was saturated with leached material at
100°C, leach rates from SYNROC were typically one-tenth of those from
glass. The leach rate of SYNROC does not appear to increase greatly
with temperature [Reeve et al., 1981, 1982], Specimens of non-radioactive
SYNROC have been irradiated in a nuclear reactor to simulate radiation
damage effects in waste stored up to 8 x 105 years. All specimens were
intact after irradiation.
The program at the AAEC's Research Establishment at Lucas Heights
includes the fabrication of non-radioactive SYNROC on a multi-kilogram
scale [Ramm and Reeve, 1982] anC continuation of radiation damage and
leach tests. Further investigations required include:
studies of the engineering practicability and costs of SYNROC
manufacture under highly radioactive conditions;
the reproducibility of the SYNROC formulation during large
scale operation; and
preparation of, and leach tests on SYNROC samples containing
rsdioactive fission products and actinides. Laboratory scale
equipment for manufacture of these samples is in course of
construction.
8. STABILITY OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE FORMS TO PADIATION
The high-level waste £orm will be subjected internally to intense
$- and Y~i^ra<iiation from fission products, and to a- and neutron-
irradiation by some actinide elements. The primary source for radiation
damage in nuclear waste solids is the displacement of constituent atoms,
mainly from contained a-emitters. Other effects include internal ion-
isation resulting in rupture of chemical bonds, valency changes, trans-
mutation of radioactive nuclei into different elements, build-up of
internal energy, and deposition of helium atoms in the waste form. The
relative importance of these effects depends on the nature of the waste
form, i.e. whether it is a supercooled liquid (glass) or a solid with a
crystal lattice (ceramic).
The majority of the radiation studies have been made on glasses
containing high-level waste; comparatively little work has been done on
the radiation stability of ceramics. Radiation studies on different
waste forms have been reviewed by Mendel et al. [1981].
The effects of radiation are being studied in accelerated tests.
High concentrations of short-lived 3- and a-emitters will deliver in a
few years doses to samples equivalent to those to be received by the
actual waste form over periods exceeding hundreds of thousands of years.
Some tests in France and the FRG have delivered doses of 3-radiation to
glasses equivalent to doses from the storage of LWR wastes over several
millions of years, without a detectable change in the glass structure
[Amaury, 1979]. In British tests, a-doses up to 5 x 1018 alpha decays
per g, equivalent to over 105 years of storage, have been delivered to
glasses; the resultant increase in leach rate was less than a factor of
two [Marples, 1982; Roberts, 1980], Tests in the US have shown that
changes to leachability or mechanical strength which had been detected
in glasses after simulated a-doses equivalent to over 10s years of
storage [Platt and McElroy, 1978] were not significant in the context of
storage in an appropriately engineered disposal system.
9. POTENTIAL LEACHING OF RADIOACTIVITY FROM VITRIFIED HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
Contact of groundwater with high-level waste results in the leaching
of radioactive constituents into solution, and ultimately in total
dissolution of the waste form. The rate of leaching depends on the type
and composition of the waste form (glass or ceramic), the temperature,
flowrate and composition of the water, and the exposed surface area of
the waste; the various radioactive elements within the waste also have
widely differing leach rates.
The release of radionuclides from waste forms by leaching involves
complex mechanisms of selective leaching and matrix dissolution. These
mechanisms are not completely understood. Actinide elements have been
observed to leach 100 times more slowly than alkali metals from borosili-
cate glass; also, leaching rates in water at 100°C are 35-50 times
greater than at 20°C [Amaury, 1979; Mendel et al., 1981],
A field test on radioactive glass in contact with a cool flowing
aquifer has been conducted in Canada for over 20 years. Fifty blocks of
nepheline syenite containing 50 TBq (1400 Ci) of fission products were
produced between 1958 and 1960. Nepheline syenite is a naturally occurr-
ing alumino-silicate material. The glass blocKr were buried below the
water table in an alluvial soil. Rates of leaching based on 90Sr
release fell during 10 years to 5 x 10"-11 g cm"2 d~ *, corresponding to
a dissolution time of more than 108 years [Tomlinson et al., 1977].
Leaching rates as low as 5 x 10"7 g cm"2 d~1 have been measured for
caesium and strontium from some French glasses at 20°C. A conservative
value of 10"5 g cm"2 d"1 has been assumed in environmental impact studies
in the UK [Hill, 1979] and USA [USDOE, 1980a]. This corresponds to a
bulk dissolution rate of 0.014 mm y~1, or a dissolution time of about
3500 years for waste fragmented into pieces 10 cm in diameter.
By contrast, glasses in contact with water at high temperature
(300°C) and high pressure (30 MPa) have been observed to undergo rapid
hydration, leading to fragmentation of the sample and leaching of about
30% of the caesium from the glass in two weeks [McCarthy et al., 1978].
This situation has been compared with that of water entry to a reposi-
tory containing high concentrations of radionuclides during the initial
few hundred years when internal temperatures will be near their maximum.
High temperature leaching tests under reflux in the laboratory have
been criticised as being more representative of waste disposal under a
'boiling waterfall1 than conditions which could reasonably be expected
in geologic burial [Savage and Chapman, 1981]. At groundwater flowrates
of 1 to 2 x 10 3 m y~ *, which are expected for crystalline rocks selected
for waste disposal, chemical saturation effects could theoretically
limit leach rates to less than 10"^  g cm~^ d~ •*• [chapman et al., 3980].
In an 88-day test under near-stagnant conditions at 200°C and 50 MPa,
leach rates of borosilicate glass fell from 3 x 10" ^ to ? x 10" ^  g crrT^
d~* [Savage, 1981]. However, the possibility of entry of an aquifer
into a repository after major ground movement, though remote, cannot be
totally excluded. Accordingly, some countries have expressed intentions
to limit temperatures in waste repositories to below 100°C, correspond-
ing to leach rates which would be acceptable. Temperatures can be
lowered by reducing the concentration of fission products in. the waste,
storing the waste for some tens of years before burial to reduce the
heat from fission product decay, and allocating adequate space for waste
canisters in the geologic medium.
10. STATUS OF GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
10.1 Isolation from the Biosphere
The main alternatives for the isolation of radioactive waste in
geological formations are as follows:
(a) Placement in a mined repository or a deep drilled hole.
(b) Placement on or below the deep ocean floor or within deep
oceanic sediments.
10.1.1 Land-based repository
The mined repository concept is now thought to be feasible, and
awaits identification of technically suitable and publicly acceptable
sites; nevertheless, public opposition to the disposal of high-level
waste in mined repositories has been strong. Investigations of potential
geologic sites have been deferred in a number of countries and dis-
continued in the UK.
Groundwater is generally considered to be the most likely agent for
the dispersal of radionuclides from a high-level radioactive waste
repository, with radionuclides being transported to the biosphere in
solution [Burkholder, 1979]. The strategy of prolonged isolation in
the geologic environment is aimed at keeping water from coming into
contact with the waste, and ensuring that if water should come into
contact with the waste it is not returned to the biosphere uiit.il its
acquired radioactivity no longer constitutes a hazard to either man or
the environment. This suggests burial, within a container of high
integrity (see Section 11), in a geologic medium that is either strong
and of extremely low permeability or is known to be isolated from ground-
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water. Isolation from the biosphere is further assured if escaping
radionuclides or heavy metals are trapped by ion exchange processes in
the repository. This could occur either on the host rock itself, on
added clay or on other minerals, or in adjacent geological strata.
In a soundly selected and engineered repository only cataclysmic
geological events - earthquake and volcanic activity - should pose a
risk of catastrophically breaching a repository over a few thousand
years. Drastic climatic change, resulting in the melting of the polar
icecaps or encroachment of ice sheets, would be needed to have a possible
impact of significance on. a repository in the same time-scale. Such
changes would also have vastly greater effects on the biosphere than the
breaching of a repository.
With an increasing time-scale, prediction of geological events and
of the long-term effects of slow, ongoing processes becomes more diffi-
cult. However sound site selection, including the selection of the host
rock, and repository design can minimise even the long-term risk of the
integrity of the repository being breached. Table 5 sets out the pro-
cesses which pose the greatest theoretical threat to a repository and
suggests the order of time in which each may be significant and the
measures available to minimise risk. Nevertheless, the effects of these
processes are not necessarily deleterious; for example, immersion of a
site in water, or coverage by an ice sheet or lava could enhance the
integrity of the repository rather than jeopardise it.
Conditions for emplacement in a geologic environment are as follows:
(a) It can be penetrated by engineered structures or large di-
ameter drillholes, kept open until emplacement is complete,
then completely sealed.
(b) It can resist perturbations around the waste, produced by
radiation-generated heat or by radiation, which might lead to
the entry of water. This suggests a strong, stable, virtually
impermeable host rock, e.g. granite (permeability generally
less than 10"9 m s"1) or plastic self-healing material such as
salt or clay.
(c) It has good sorption properties for the radioactive constitu-
ents of the waste.
(d) It preferably has high thermal conductivity which will dis-
perse the heat energy from the waste.
The mined repository concept has received the major design effort
and feasibility studies of crystalline rock and salt are well advanced.
11
The deep-hole disposal method could be regarded as a variant of the
mined repository, since much of the research and experimental work on
mined repositories in crystalline rock, salt and clay would be appli-
cable to the development of a deep-hole repository. The deep-hole
concept has to seme extent been neglectedr although countries with small
nuclear power programs have shown interest in pursuing this line of
investigation, which has been advocated by Ringwood [1980b].
10.1.2 Seabed Disposal
At this stage, no country considers placement of high-level radio-
active waste on or in the deep ocean floor to be a suitable option,
although confidence in seabed or sub-seabed disposal as a technically
acceptable alternative to land-based repositories has been expressed by
France, Japan and the US [Anderson, 1981]. At present, such disposal is
expressly prohibited under an international convention, and major poli-
tical questions on the use of the seabed are expected to occupy inter-
national forums for sowe years before such a proposal could become a
realistic option. Procedures for placement of the waste, proving the
methods of canister retrievability from malplacement (a stipulated
requirement for ocean floor disposal) and monitoring the performance of
ocean floor disposal are the subject of considerable effort from members
of the OECD-NBA. Countries actively participating in the OECD-NEA
Seabed Working Group Program include Canada, the Commission of European
Communities (CEC), France, Japan, the Netherlands, UK and USA, while
countries with observer status are Belgium, the FRG, and Switzerland
[Talbert, 1982].
10.2 Current Status of Host Rock Types
Table 4 summarises national investigations of geologic formations
and programs for the establishment of demonstration and commercial high-
level waste repositories. Sweden, the FRG, Canada and the USA are lead-
ing with in-situ studies of their geologic formations [Thoregren et al.,
1980; Salander et al., 1980; USDOE, 1980c; Boulton, 1980; Shemilt,
1981].
The advantages and disadvantages of the various rock types being
considered for repositories are set out in Table 6. It may be seen that
no formation is without some disadvantage. Borehole and shaft sealing
is a requirement common to all repositories. The IAEA have recently
concluded [IAEA, 1982] that a site with ideal characteristics is not
essential for siting an appropriately engineered waste repository.
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10.2.1 Salt
In the late Fifties and early Sixties, it was believed by most
earth scientists concerned with waste disposal that salt deposits would
be an acceptable geologic environment for the storage of all forms and
all levels of radioactive waste. Pierce and Rich [1962] summarised data
on all the known salt deposits in the United States. Their summary
showed that salt, either as bedded salt or in salt domes, occurs in 23
States. These original regional studies of salt deposits were used in
the selection of the bedded salt deposits in Kansas and later in New
Mexico as potential locations for high-level waste repositories. The
Kansas site was abandoned primarily for hydrogeologic reasons [De
Buchanane, 1976], but in New Mexico construction of the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) is in progress; it will be the first US facility
designed and constructed to gather data and demonstrate on a large-scale
the feasibility of disposal of radioactive waste in bedded salt [Langley,
1979].
The Federal Republic of Germany carried out a number of research
and development projects at the Asse salt mine, including the construc-
tion of a pilot plant for the handling and disposal of low- and inter-
mediate-level radioactive waste. It is now proceeding with the con-
struction of a high-level repository in the Gorleben salt dome [Kuhn et
al., 1980]. Another project, under investigation in Denmark, is the
feasibility of disposing of high-level waste in a deep hole in one of
the salt domes in Jutland.
The US National Academy of Sciences advised the US Atomic Energy
Commission in 1957 that salt was the formation of first choice for the
disposal of radioactive waste. By 1970, considerably more information
was available on the reaction of salt to increases in temperature and
pressure and to radiation, together with studies on the physical chem-
istry of fluids in salt which had cast some light on the formation of
breccias and solution cavities in salt. An early demonstration of the
engineering techniques for the handling and placement of short-cooled
spent fuel assemblies in salt were encouraging [Bradshaw and McClain,
1971]. However, the major disadvantages in the use of salt as a dis-
posal medium are its potential for creep with concomitant difficulties
if waste form retrieval is desired, and the corrosive nature of bittern
inclusions (saturated solutions of chlorides). The determination of
site-specific conditions such as hydrogeology is a requirement for all
geological types. These factors may present long-term containment
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difficulties for some sites and are discussed in more detail below.
Creep within salt
The creep of salt around openings in salt rock is governed by the
naturally low limit of elastic behaviour of salt rock which is of the
order of only 70 kPa (100 psi). The rate of creep becomes constant when
the supported load remains unchanged [Baar, 1973]. Mine pillar deform-
ation can cause vertical closure of openings, also at a constant rate,
and is commonly accompanied by subsidence at the surface. An increase
in temperature will cause the rate of creep to increase; however,
design principles based on in-situ measurements in salt mines for more
than 20 years provide a firm basis for the design of openings and for
support systems within a salt formation [Baar, 1975]. Lower tempera-
tures may be attained by reducing the density of canister placement by
ageing the waste before burial, or by removing heat generated by the
waste by ventilation until the repository is abandoned and sealed and
the control of creep no longer required.
Because of the susceptibility of glass to leaching at higher tem-
peratures, some countries intend to limit temperatures in waste reposi-
tories to less than 100°C. This limitation on repository temperatures
to some extent offsets the disadvantage of creep in salt which is more
of a problem at higher temperatures. It has led to a hardening of
opinion in the USA in favour of wastes being retrievable for arbitrary
periods ranging from 5 to 50 years. For waste to be retrievable,
ventilation would have to be maintained thereby ensuring that some of
the heat generated by the waste was exhausted from the repository. The
penalty for retrievability is a costlier installation and an additional
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operational cost until the facility is finally sealed.
Presence of bitterns
Bittern is the highly concentrated solution that remains after the
crystallisation of common salt (NaCl); the solution is rich in chlorides
of magnesium and potassium which remain in solution at high concentrations.
The initial studies of water in salt gradually developed into the
study of the physical chemistry of bitterns contained within salt de-
posits. The migration of bittern inclusions towards sources of heat
[Roedder and Belkin, 1980] , the low pH and the high percentage of salts
in solution in bitterns make the salt medium highly corrosive to emplaced
waste and its containers [Clynne et al., 1980]. Although lower tempera-
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tures in a repository should reduce the potential for canister corrosion,
this problem is being closely examined, as are the consequences of the
contact of bitterns with radioactive materials in the canister [Stewart
and Potter, 1979].
Geologic evidence indicates that the central mass of most preserved
evaporite deposits has remained isolated from the surrounding ground-
water system for millions of years [Brookins et al., 1980]. It is
reasonable to assume that such a mass will retain its integrity unless a
destabilising element, such as a localised heat source, is introduced
that would lead to an increase in the fluid phase as bitterns. Canisters
of waste provide such a localised heat source and this justifies
further research and development before a salt repository is finally
approved.
Hydrogeology
Groundwater systems are determined by many factors, and are com-
plex. They must therefore be studied for each prospective disposal
site, and conditions at each must be understood to a sufficient degree
so that a reliable prediction of the possible interaction between the
groundwater, the salt deposit and the emplaced waste can be made. This
is particularly important in a mined repository at shallow depths, where
groundwater tends to circulate more freely than at greater depths and
could be a potential threat to the integrity of the repository.
By contrast, the hydrogeologic system poses a lesser threat to a
repository of the deep-hole type, where the waste would be disposed of
at depths approaching the limit of circulating waters.
Salt domes intrude through a great thickness of sediments and
usually intercept several aquifers. It can often be shown that domes
have undergone dissolution by groundwater. In fact, the 'cap rock1
formation immediately overlying many domes is generally interpreted as
the accumulation of insoluble residues previously dispersed in the salt
mass [Bodenlos, 1970],
The groundwater hydrology in proximity to salt domes is usually
complicated by the faulting and extensive disturbance that the sediments
have undergone as a consequence of the salt intrusion. In the face of
the overwhelming geologic evidence pointing to past salt dissolution, it
should be established beyond doubt that salt dissolution is not taking
place at any salt dome being considered as a repository for radioactive
waste; an adequate understanding of the entire problem of the inter-
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actions between salt domes and ground water would require additional
extensive investigation [Gera, 1975].
The origin of collapse structures and breccias that vertically
penetrate apparently impermeable evaporitos has not been satisfactorily
explained. Anderson and Kirkland [1980] postulated that the source of
the dissolving water, if acting under a hydraulic head, would establish
a flow cycle in which the dissolved salt provides the density gradient
to maintain the movement of water and so continue dissolution of the
salt. They cited the Delaware Basin in western Texas and south-east New
Mexico as a good example of how brine density flow can produce dis-
solution chambers that collapse to form breccias. They considered that
the potential for dissolution by brine flow is an inherent property of
partly exhumed evaporites.
Salt with a low water content (less than 0.5 wt%) is less likely to
mobilise bitterns; however, the identification of such low water-
content zones with a salt deposit is not a simple matter. The water
content in bedded salt and in some dome salt can exceed 3 per cent, and
it has been reported that adjacent samples of bedded salt may differ
widely in water content [Roedder and Belkin, 1979]. The basic method of
investigation of geologic formations is the study of drillcores; be-
cause of the variability of salt formations, close drilling of a pros-
pective site may be necessary - and all holes would subsequently require
sealing against leakage.
The use of geophysical techniques to detect voids and porosity
variations in salt rock has been proposed as a reliable means of in-
vestigation in the future [USDOE, 1980c]. The effectiveness of seismic
techniques to detect voids and possibly pockets of water in salt rock, as
distinct from salt with a high percentage of inclusions of water, has
been demonstrated. However, its use is restricted to near-field con-
ditions ahead of a mining face or to zones between two closely spaced
boreholes. According to Rothemeyer [1980], the application of a newly
developed high-frequency method to reflection measurements in a borehole
and absorption measurements between two boreholes will identify inhomo-
geneous qualities of the rock up to several hundred metres away from the
boreholes. The ability to discriminate between voids, changes in lithol-
ogy, and moisture content variations has yet to be proved, but the method
holds some promise for future investigations.
There is little doubt that some salt deposits could have properties
that would meet the current specifications for a high-level waste reposi-
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tory; it is equally probable that there are many that would not meet
the specifications. There is a need for more site-specific research
into the effect of the hydrogeologic system on the long-term integrity
of each proposed repository.
10.2.2 Crystalline rock
The term 'crystalline rock1 is used here for coarse-grained intru-
sive igneous rocks such as granite, granodiorite, diorite and gabbro;
although differing in chemical composition, they have similar physical
properties. Basalt (see Section 10.2.3), though generally a crystalline
rock, is not an intrusive rock but is of volcanic origin.
Sweden is in the vanguard of the study of crystalline rock and
intends to use it as a repository for high-level nuclear waste.
Feasibility and site selection studies have been made at a number of
sites and special research areas have been established at Finnsjon near
Forsmark, the abandoned mine at Stripa, and Studsvik to determine the
methods of investigation and criteria for confirmation of a repository
site.
The construction of an underground repository in crystalline rock
at depths to 5000 m can be achieved with standard drill and blast mining
methods. Openings will generally be self-supporting and require only
limited support measures in zones with a higher incidence of fractures
or with high stress concentrations. Openings would generally be stable
at repository temperatures of 300°C at atmospheric pressure. At the
higher fluid pressures likely to be encountered in crystalline rock at a
depth of one kilometre, some minerals will decompose in the presence of
water. The rate of decomposition will depend on site-specific factors,
and the process would continue until equilibrium was attained, probably
within 1000 years. Mineral decomposition will probably be confined to
rock exposed to groundwater in joints in the immediate vicinity of the
repository and is not expected to weaken the rock structurally [Chapman,
1978]. The minerals formed by decomposition will probably include some
with layer structures that will fix radionuclides by ion exchange.
Although it is not yet established whether mineral decomposition will
be detrimental to the confinement of high-level waste within a repository
[Chapman, 1980], the current European proposals are to restrict tempera-
tures within the repository to about 100°C [Burton and Griffin, 1981];
however, Mather et al. [1982] have claimed that there is no geochemical
rationale for this restrictive limitation, as geochemical processes
of waste degradation and waste/rock interaction in the hydrothermal
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environment remain predictable to about 200°C.
Ventilation will be required to cool the repository to permit access
during deep placement of the waste, and during any subsequent period of
retrieval; it will not be required at any time other than to ensure
access.
Crystalline rock would also be suitable for the disposal of high-
level waste by the deep-hole method. Contrary to some reports in waste
disposal literature, drilling large diameter holes to depths of 5000 m in
rock at high temperatures is not beyond current technology [USDOE,
1980a]. Geothermal energy investigations in hot dry rock have included
drilling 300 mm diameter holes to depths of more than 4500 m at tempera-
tures in excess of 300°C [Pettit, 1981]. Geothermal energy investi-
gations are confined to areas with a high thermal gradient (about 20°C
per 1000 m); however, the gradient varies within the Earth's crust and
depends on the composition of the crustal rocks and on the tectonic
state of the crust. Greater depths could be achieved in cooler zones
with a temperature gradient of 10°C per 1000 m, which is only half the
gradient found in hot dry rock. These achievements provide a sound
basis for further development.
As ventilation is not required in a deep drillhole repository,
refractory waste forms such as ceramics and SYNROC that are stable at
higher temperatures could be placed in such a repository.
Water in crystalline rock is held in fractures, the openings of
which decrease with depth. Permeabilities of 10"8 cm s"* or less,
measured by water injection tests, were found at depths of more than 300
m in the granite at Stripa in Sweden [Gale et al., 1980]. In general,
permeability will decrease with depth. Other advantages associated with
depth include a decrease in the potential for groundwater movement and
an increase in the distance along flow lines that water must travel
before reaching the biosphere [KBS, 1978a]. The size of a repository is
a factor in determining the amount of water that will have access to the
waste. A large repository would intersect more fractures and more water
would be expected to come into contact with the waste containers than is
the case for a more compact repository such as a large diameter vertical
hole. Sealing the deep-hole repository with a bentonite-sand mix would
ensure that water entering the hole was absorbed in the bentonite; this
would expand to form an impermeable barrier around waste in the hole,
effectively blocking the entry of more water.
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The problems of constructing a high-level waste repository in
crystalline rock are well understood. Investigations are continuing
into the most appropriate methods for the measurement of site-specific
properties such as permeability and heat transfer, and general research
is concerned with geochemistry and the adsorption characteristics of the
rocks. Many crystalline rock masses seem likely to meet the current
specifications for the design and construction of a mined repository for
high-level waste. The technology is available for the thorough investi-
gation of the geology and hydrogeology of crystalline rock. Apart from
the time that such an investigation would take (about eight years), the
project should not involve major new technical problems. About ten
years would probably be required to develop and test procedures for the
construction of a deep-hole repository in crystalline rock.
10.2.3 Basalt
Basalt is a volcanic lava with a texture which ranges from medium-
grained crystalline to glassy. Although most basalt would be considered
a fine-grained crystalline rock, its general physical properties are
somewhat different from those of coarse-grained crystalline rocks such
as granites. Thick bodies of basalt are generally made up of many sub-
horizontal flows with a high incidence of fractures known as shrinkage
fractures. The construction of an underground repository in basalt at
depths similar to that for crystalline rock can be achieved by conven-
tional drill and blast mining techniques. Openings, in general, will be
self-supporting except where fractures are more numerous or where stresses
are concentrated. As with granite, the openings would generally be
stable at repository temperatures up to SOO^C at atmospheric pressure.
In a confined repository with a build-up of fluid pressure, mineral de-
composition similar to that observed in granite would take place; this
is not expected to weaken the rock structurally, and it may form minerals
with layered structures that would fix radionuclides by ion exchange.
However, until the consequences of such changes have been fully investi-
gated, low repository temperatures of less than 100°C are preferred.
The difference in the use of basalt and crystalline rocks such as
granite for repository construction is that associated with vertical
thickness. Crystalline rocks emplaced by upward movement from deep
within the Earth's crust extend to great depths, are homogeneous, and
their composition does not change with depth. Basalt bodies are gener-
ally less thick, composition within a series of flows may vary consid-
erably, and they may be underlain by sedimentary rock. Flows may be
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interbedded with sedimentary rock, and permeable strata below and between
basalt flows may be sources of water under pressure. The generally
higher incidence of fractures in basalt enhances their good aquifer
characteristics in many areas, and variation in the number of fractures
and joints in the individual flows and tuffs of a basalt formation
contributes to a complex hydrogeologic system.
Joints in basalt form when individual flow? have cooled, c;nc3 many
joints may have been sealed by the late formation of minerals. The
modelling of such a complex hydrogeologic system requires a more com-
prehensive investigation than would be required for a more uniformly
jointed rock such as granite.
Sealing the repositories and plugging the drillholes will assume
more importance in the assessment of basalt as a potential geologic
medium because there are more fractures and joints in basalt than in
crystalline rock. The Columbia Basalt, which occupies the Pasco Basin
in Oregon, is under consideration for the disposal of high-level radio-
active waste. Extensive hydrogeologic investigations to depths greater
than 3000 m indicate that the fracture permeability of some of the thick
basalt flows is very low; this makes them suitable for assessment as a
repository [Deju and Evans, 1980].
Basalt to 3000 m thickness, a rare phenomenon, is confined to trap
occurrences. The more common interbedded sediment and basalt sequences
lack homogeneity and would not, prima facie, be regarded as suitable for
the disposal of high-level waste.
Reservations should be maintained on the use of basalt until hydro-
geologic studies on a basin by a major hydrogeological organisation pro-
duce a reliable site-specific model for the prediction of groundwater
movement. More data on ion-exchange capability of site-specific basalt
deposits are also required.
•10.2.4 Clay and shale
Clays form a family of fine platy minerals with a range of chemical
composition and crystal structure, and with excellent ion-exchange
properties. The term "clay1 as a name for a geologic formation means an
aggregate of predominantly clay minerals, but includes particles of
other minerals and rock fragments, generally less than 0.074 mm in size
(i.e. they will pass through a No. 200 sieve). Clay materials range in
consistency from a spongy ooze to firm, partially consolidated mater-
ials. Clay bodies form both by deposition as sediments and as products
of the weathering of rock. Consolidation of clay takes place by com-
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paction under the weight of overlying sediments which expels much of the
water from the clay. Consolidated clay with a layered sedimentary
structure is called shale,- where there is no layered structure, it is
called mudstone or claystone.
Clay minerals hold a large quantity of water within their molecular
structure, but this water is not released unless the molecular structure
is disturbed. Clay bodies generally have a low permeability to water
owing to the lack of pore spaces. Clays are structurally weak and creep
under load. The eventual load to be carried by a support system for an
opening in clay will be a considerable portion of the weight of the
overlying material; the installation of supports to maintain openings
at depth in clay is a major cost of construction.
The chemical reactions and movement of fluids in clay in response
to an increase in temperature are two areas requiring further research,
and maintenance of low temperatures is likely to be an essential re-
quirement for the storage or disposal of radioactive waste in clay form-
ations.
In Belgium, the construction of such a repository is regarded as
feasible only if it is built within 250 m of the surface [Heremans,
1978]. Because of the many unknown factors associated with water
migration in clay and chemical reactions in response to an increase in
temperature, temperatures above 100°C in a clay repository are unde-
sirable at this stage [Heremans, 1978]. In Italy, drilling has been
undertaken with the aim of disposing of high-level waste in a deep hole
in clay formations. Reports so far have provided a considerable amount
of drilling data, but the feasibility of the project has not been fully
assessed [Mittempergher, 1979].
The term 'shale1 is applied to a range of materials which consist
predominantly of quartz grains and clay minerals, and have a broad range
of physical properties. Underground openings can be constructed at
greater depths in shale than in clay, but the support system is likely
to be a major requirement of any construction. Shales may have consider-
able fracture permeability, but this will be greatly reduced at depth.
The regional groundwater system model would have to take account of rock
types other than shale since they also influence the hydrogeologic
system. Strata with much greater permeability than shale are likely to
provide the major site-specific control within the groundwater system.
Near-surface in-situ heater tests are in progress in the Eleana
Argillite at the Nevada Weapons Test Site, and the Conasauga Shale in
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the Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee. A preliminary evaluation of the
response of the Eleana Argillite to heating indicates that the behaviour
of expandable clays is a major concern [Lappin and Olsson, 1979];
shrinkage oi: clay as water is driven off causes pre-existing joints to
open, and results in a marked reduction in in-situ thermal conductivity.
In the water-saturated Conasauga Shale, the most pronounced effect of
the near-surface heater tests was the increased chemical activity in the
presence of groundwater whereby metal corrosion and the alteration of
borosilicate glass were considerably enhanced by refluxing steam.
Despite the water-saturated nature of the shale, conduction rather than
convection was the principal mode of heat transport [Krumhansl and
Sandberg, .1979].
The Eleana Shale is in an elevated area of Nevada where the main
water table is at a depth of about 1500 m. The information available
suggests that most radionuclides would become fixed within the thick
sequences of unsaturated rock above the water table. The main hydro-
geologic input into this investigation should identify the perched water
tables and aquicludes, and ascertain the conditions under which seepages
to the surface may take place. Exceptional events such as the 500-year
maximum precipitation recharge need to be considered.
10.3 Plugging Boreholes and Shafts in Waste Repositories
Plugging boreholes and shafts was the subject of a workshop organ-
ised by the OECD-NEA Coordinating Group on Geologic Disposal at
Columbus, Ohio, in May 1980. The materials under investigation for
plugging generally include a proportion of bentonite which contains
water-expansive smectite clays. Where a repository is sited in cry-
stalline rock or in basalt that contains fractures, a clay medium is
preferred to block the movement of groundwater into or out of the re-
pository.
Sweden proposed to use highly compacted bentonite and mixtures of
bentonite and quartz grains as buffer materials in radioactive waste
repositories in crystalline rock. Experiments are being conducted to
examine the effects of water uptake and temperature increase on the
swelling and physicochemical properties of plugging materials. The
effectiveness of the sealing of fractures and joints in crystalline rock
by using bentonite grouting techniques, and electrophoresis is also
being evaluated [Pusch et al., 1980].
The US is carrying out shaft and borehole plugging studies in the
Columbia River Basalt, and in salt in south-eastern New Mexico; the
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development of cement mixes, and the long-term durability of plugs is
also being investigated. Similar plugging concepts have also been
developed by the FRG, the Netherlands and Belgium; in all cases a com-
bination of cement and natural materials derived from the formations
that have been penetrated has been proposed.
A maximum temperature of 100°C at the canister surface has been
recommended [INFCE, 1980] for the proper functioning of backfill mater-
ials such as bentonite mixtures.
The use of brucite and periclase as high temperature sealant
materials was proposed for sealing SYNROC in a deep-hole repository
[Ringwood, 1978].
The OECD-NEA Co-ordinating Group on Geologic Disposal has proposed
that an ad hoc group of experts should consider the functions of bore-
hole plugging and shaft sealing, and the criteria that should be met as
a preliminary step towards reaching international agreement. Consider-
able practical work remains to be done before international agreement on
satisfactory methods of shaft and hole sealing is attained.
Although the general methods by which the plugging of boreholes and
shafts may be attained are accepted, the specific methods to be used and
proved for a repository will depend very much on the specific properties
of the host rock.
11. ISOLATION OF BURIED WASTE
Forces which might return some of the buried radionuclides to the
biosphere have been reviewed by Burkholder [1979] and are illustrated in
Figure 2. Contact of buried waste with groundwater, followed by leaching
of radioactive constituents from the waste form, is generally considered
to be the most probable pathway. No waste form has yet been developed
that is totally insoluble in water; the greatest leaching rates could
occur during the initial few hundred years after burial, owing to the
local increase in the temperature of the geologic medium and contained
groundwater through fission product decay heat.
Geologic burial strategy employs sequential independent barriers to
retain the radioactive elements underground. Waste packages have been
designed to prevent access of water to the primary waste form for at
least 1000 years. These packages consist of the radioactive glass or
ceramic, sheathed in corrosion-resistant metals such as lead and titan-
ium [KBS, 1978a], and surrounded by an absorbent overpack, e.g. benton-
ite clay. The overpack has two functions: to hydrate, swell and seal
the inner package against major water ingress, and to provide an envir-
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onment which can absorb radioactive materials which might eventually be
leached from the waste form. The composite waste package is surrounded
by a bentonite liner during placement in the geologic medium. The host
rock may provide a further barrier through chemical interaction or
absorption of some radionuclides leached from the waste package [Roy,
1361j. The probability that waste material buried in an argillaceous
(clay) formation will breach the barriers and enter groundwater has been
estimated by fault tree analysis [D'Alessandro et al., 1980] as follows:
Time following burial
1000 y
10 000 y
100 000 y
Probability of release
5 x 10"5 - 2 x 10"4
2 x 10"^  - 3 x 10"3
2 x 10"3 - 2 x 10~2
Greater probabilities of release could be expected from crystalline
rocks, such as granite, which are not self-sealing.
12. SAFETY OF A HIGH-LEVEL WASTE REPOSITORY
Smith et al. [1980] reviewed several perspectives on potential
risks from buried high-level wastes. Hazard indices were based on the
amount of water required to dilute a unit quantity of a substance to
drinking water standards. A radiotoxic hazard index [USNRC, 1976] was
used to compare the total radiotoxicity of fission products and actinide
elements in high-level waste, plus associated geologic medium, with that
of an equal mass of a uranium ore body. The US Department of Energy
[USDOE, 1980a], after Hamstra [1975], defined a relative toxicity index
to compare the radiotoxicity of high-level waste from 1 t of spent LWR
fuel with that of the uranium ore mined to manufacture the fuel.
The relative toxicity index for high-level waste and uranium ore is
compared in Figure 3 with similarly developed toxicity indices for ranges
of non-radioactive ores. The toxicity index of the high-level waste
after 80 years in geologic burial is comparable with that of average
mercury ore. After 200 years, it is comparable with lead ore, and after
1500 years, the hazard index of the waste is similar to that of the ore
from which it came [USDOE, 1980a]. A longer period of isolation is
indicated for unreprocessed fuel because of its uranium and plutonium
content. It must not be inferred that 1500 years is an adequate period
of isolation for high-level waste; uranium, lead and mercury ores are
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chemically toxic substances also. The comparison is useful only to
indicate the storage time necessary to reduce hazard levels of high-
level wastes to those of familiar ores present near or at the Earth's
surface.
13. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSES OF FAILURE OF A HIGH-LEVEL WASTE REPOSITORY
Generic assessments of radiological doses resulting from ingress of
water into a high-level waste burial site have been conducted in Sweden
[KBS, 1978a], the UK [Hill, 1979; Hill and Lawson, 1980], the US [USDOE,
1980a] and by the Commission of European Communities [Girardi et al.,
1978]. These studies have assumed that water ingress to the waste
occurred after 1000 years of geologic burial.
13.1 The KBS Study
The Swedish study considered high-level wastes resulting from 330
GWe y of nuclear power, generated by 13 LWRs over 20 years. A total of
9000 t U of spent fuel was reprocessed and the high-level wastes were
vitrified. The vitrified waste was assumed to have been stored for 40
years before disposal to reduce heat from fission product decay. Cani-
sters of waste were encapsulated in lead and titanium, and buried in
bentonite at a depth of 500 m in a granite formation at temperatures not
exceeding 80°C.
Corrosion studies indicated that groundwater would contact the
vitrified waste from 1000 to 6000 years after burial, when temperatures
had fallen to 25°C. The waste was assumed to have been fractured through
earlier thermal stresses and its surface area increased five-fold.
Leaching rates of borosilicate waste glass, measured in the laboratory
at 25°C, indicated a conservative period of 30 000 years for total
dissolution of the residual radionuclides. The contaminated groundwater
was assumed to percolate slowly upwards through the granite rock to
three locations: a source of drinking water, a lake and the Baltic Sea.
Retardation and decay of the radionuclides during passage were
calculated from adsorption coefficients measured on Swedish granites.
Radiological doses were estimated for hypothetical populations exposed
by drinking water from deep wells near the repository, by using water
from the lake to irrigate food crops, by ingestion of fish, and exposure
to sea-water and coastal sediments. Maximum individual doses were
received from the drinking well; doses from the lake and the ocean
model pathways were lower by factors of 20 and 2000 respectively [KBS,
1978a].
Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of individual doses received over
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a 30-year period for a most probable and an upper limit case. Indi-
vidual radiological whole body equivalent doses derived from radionuclides
from the buried waste rose to a maximum annual value of 0.15 mSv (15
mrem) after about 200 000 years. This dose is equivalent to less than
8 per cent of the annual dose from an 'average1 natural background level
of 2 mSv y~l (200 mrem y"1^ [UNSCEAR, 1981] . A greater dose could be
received today from the radium-226 contained in drinking water from some
granite areas in Sweden. Similar low individual doses were estimated in
the Swedish KBS-II study on the deep geologic burial of unreprocessed
spent fuel, encapsulated in corrosion-resistant copper canisters [KBS,
1978b].
Table 7 lists the maximum radiological doses to individuals and
the major radionuclides responsible for the dose from the waste repository.
These maxima are not additive, as the time at which the maximum dose
per nuclide was estimated to be reached ranged from 7 x 10^ y (iodine-129)
to 5 x 105 y (caesium-135) after the repository was filled and sealed.
At the time corresponding to the maximum individual dose (2 x 10^  y),
neptunium-237 was predominant, contributing 63 per cent of the
maximum, followed by uranium-233 (19 per cent) and radium-226 (15 per
cent). It is of interest that the contribution from plutonium-239,
a radionuclide of major public concern, was estimated at less than
0.001 per cent of the maximum dose.
The precision of radiological dose estimates in the KBS and similar
generic studies depends on the validity of the mathematical model and
the values of parameters used for calculation. Johanssen and Steen
[1979] have claimed that uncertainties about some radionuclide adsorp-
tion coefficients of granite and its permeability could increase the KBS
dose estimates by between one and two orders of magnitude. Independent
reviews of the KBS studies have agreed with the leaching characteristics
adopted for glass [Ross et al., 1978], and generally with the method-
ology and overall conclusions for a well-engineered, bedrock repository
in a chosen site [NAS, 1980] . It was noted that the ability of granite
to adsorb radionuclides would be far more critical if water penetrated
the waste packages within the first few decades, and if bentonite was
not added as overpack and backfill. In an investigation of dose esti-
mate variability conducted for the KBS Study, Bergstrom [1981] recog-
nised the importance of equilibrium constants for soil-water systems and
the need for further studies on radiological intake through food chains.
Confirmation of adsorption coefficient measurements of radionuclides in
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granite is a major part of the in-situ geological studies underway at
Stripa in Sweden [Witherspoon et al., 1981].
13.2 Other Consequence Studies
Maximum individual radiological doses from high-level waste dispo-
sal estimated in five independent generic studies have been normalised
and compared in Figure 5. The consequences of repository failure in the
first year after filling and decommissioning have been assessed [USDOE,
1979a], but this case was subsequently discounted as a credible situ-
ation and it was considered that detection and remedial action would
protect individuals from the high doses estimated [USDOE, 1980a] . All
other studies examined have assumed 1000 years of isolation for the
waste before its dispersion by groundwater.
Dissolution times of the waste in groundwater, ranging from a few
hundred to several tens of thousands of years, did not have a major
effect on the maximum doses estimated. The effect of different food
chains and the dilution mechanism indicated some advantages for coastal
siting of a repository; estimated doses were between one-sixtieth and
one-five hundredth of those estimated for an inland site [Hill and
Lawson, 1980]. Lowest doses were estimated for waste packages disposed
of on the deep ocean floor [Camplin et al., 1980], although this type of
disposal of high-level waste is expressly prohibited by an international
convention.
13.3 The Significance of Neptunium-237
The transfer fraction of neptunium-237 from the gastro-intestinal
tract into the blood has been recognised recently as a parameter which
requires further study and which could have significant influence on
maximum individual radiological doses [Hill, 1979; Bergstro'm, 1981] .
Neptunium is a major contributor to estimates of the maximum dose:
a value of 10" ^ was recently recommended by the International Commission
on Radiological Protection for the transfer fraction of neptunium-237
[ICRP, 1979]; by comparison, that previously recommended was 10"l+ [ICRP,
1959]. This increased transfer fraction is reflected in the difference
between the estimate of 5000 ySv y"1 (500 mrem y"1) by Hill and Lawson
[1980] and of 150 ySv y"1 (15 mrem y"1) by KBS [1978a]. An even greater
maximum individual dose of 60 mSv y"l (6 rem y"1) was estimated from
neptunium-237 in earlier studies [Hill & Grimwood, 1978; Hill, 1979]
which used conservative assumptions in the models recognised as leading
to overestimates of potential doses.
The significance of the potential dose from neptunium-237 in a
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waste repository is subject to an uncertainty of up to two orders of
magnitude. The increased value for the transfer fraction was based on a
small number of experiments on rats; it has been recognised that the
fractional absorption of trace quantities of neptunium may be a factor
of ten lower, as may also be the fractional absorption of neptunium
incorporated in food [ICRP, 1979]. Evaluation of factors influencing
punum
-l-O H1-*--1- \.
at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories.
13.4 Sensitivity of Dose to Changes in Parameter Values
The sensitivity of the maximum individual annual dose to some
changes in parameter values was estimated by Hill [1979] in a model with
conservative parameter values. An order of magnitude alteration in
parameter values in the reference case resulted in the following reduc-
tion factors on the maximum individual dose:
Parameter
Sorption
Groundwater velocity
Flow path length
Leach rate
Dispersion coefficient
Reduction factor
20
12
8.6
6
Hill [1979] concluded that the rate of migration of radionuclides
through the biosphere was of primary importance in determining potential
dose, and that the leach rate of the waste form was of secondary concern
in a wide range of circumstances.
The reduction factor is also dependent on parameter values. Table
8 illustrates application of the data to the model by Hill and Lawson
[1980]. Sorption is of less importance because of the assumption that
10 per cent of the neptunium would be present either in the strongly or
weakly adsorbed form. Groundwater flow at lower velocities assumes
greater significance in reduction of dose. The estimated sensitivities
(reduction factors) corresponding to one order of magnitude change in
parameter values are: groundwater velocity (55); dispersion coefficient
(7); leach rate (8); sorption (3); flowpath length (3).
13.5 Minimum Performance Criteria for Repositories
Following these generic studies, minimum performance criteria were
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proposed for high-level waste packages and underground facilities in the
US [USNRC, 1981]. These are both to be designed so that, assuming
anticipated processes and events, and including full or partial satura-
tion,
the waste packages will contain all radionuclides for at least
1000 years after permanent closure;
at any subsequent time, the annual release rate of any radio-
nuclide into the geologic setting shall not exceed 10"5 per
year assuming that no prior release had occurred; and
this limitation excludes radionuclides contributing less than
0.1 per cent of the total permissible annual release.
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has requested comment
on whether aims for containment and release rates should be redefined to
be "as long and as low as are reasonably achievable". The Federal
Republic of Germany is reported to believe that the time range for
consideration of waste form stability should be limited to 10 000 years,
beyond which, rational scientific predictions cannot be made [IAEA,
1980]. The US has considered it impractical to apply standards for
disposal of uranium mill tailings for as long as 10 000 years [USEPA,
1980]; hazard indexes of high-level waste and uranium ores are roughly
equivalent after 1500 years.
14. RADIATION DOSES AND RISKS FROM A HIGH-LEVEL WASTE REPOSITORY IN
PERSPECTIVE
The basic objective of radioactive waste disposal is the protection
of man and his environment from an unacceptable level of risk. For
radiological protection, the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) has assumed conservatively that all radiation expo-
sures may carry some risk of induced disease, disability or death [ICRP,
1977], the level of risk being directly proportional to the radiation
dose received. Generic studies indicate that geologic burial of high-
level wastes may, after several thousand years, result in an increase in
the natural radiation background in the vicinity of the repository.
Individuals in this vicinity may, therefore, receive a fractional
increase in their normal annual dose. The risk of death from this
addition may be insignificant but it is assumed not to be zero.
The annual doses and risks from living near a high-level waste
repository in the far distant future may be placed in perspective by
comparison with doses received today from nuclear power and its fuel
cycle, from the natural radiation background, and incurred from man-made
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sources of radiation [IAEA/WHO, 1981; IAEA, 1979].
14.1 Radiation Doses from Nuclear Power and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
An average global annual radiation dose of 0.6 ySv y~1 from nuclear
power production has been estimated. The largest contributors to local
and regional collective doses [UNSCEAR, 1981] were from uranium mining
and milling (75%), nuclear power reactors (17%) and spent fuel repro-
cessing (7%). An average annual dose of 3 v-Sv y~ * has been estimated
from nuclear energy in the UK, with maximum annual doses to members of
the public during the late 1970s [NRPB, 1981] derived from reprocessing
(1.5 mSv y"1), nuclear reactor operation (300 ySv y"1) and uranium
upgrading and fuel manufacture (55 ySv y~*). A lower maximum annual
dose of 880 ySv y~1 was estimated for 1981 [BNFL, 1982]. This followed
a reduction in the amount of 137Cs discharged annually in liquid efflu-
ent, together with a reduced estimate of marine food consumption by the
critical group. Maximum annual doses of several hundred microsieverts
have been reported for UK nuclear research and development establish-
ments [Taylor and Webb, 1978]. A maximum annual dose of 10 ySv y~ * has
been estimated for critical groups from operation of the AAEC Lucas
Heights Research Laboratories.
14.2 Radiation Doses from the Natural Background
Recent consideration of internal doses from ingestion of short-
lived daughters of 220Rn and 222Rn [NRPB, 1981; UNSCEAR, 1981] have
increased estimates of typical annual radiological doses from natural
background from about 1 mSv y~~-1 (100 mrem y"1) to 1.8 - 2 mSv y" 1
(180 - 200 mrem y~*). Additional radiation doses are incurred from
chest and dental X-rays (0.4 and 0.2 mSv respectively), and from inter-
national air travel (Table 9).
Individuals are able to vary their natural radiation background to
some extent by choice of residence and lifestyle. For example, the
annual radiation dose from cosmic rays may be reduced by about 0.1 mSv
y~-1 if a person chooses to reside in Sydney (sea level) in New South
Wales instead of, say, Canberra. In Australia, sunbathing for 2 hours
per day on Kingscliff Beach in New South Wales can result in an annual
external dose of 320 ySv y~l, which is equivalent to a continual expo-
sure rate of 3.8 mSv y~ l -, by contrast, sunbathing for the same period on
a Woronora River beach, also in New South Wales, would incur an annual
external dose of 29 ySv y~l [Hespe, 1979]. Thorium in beach sands at
Kerala, India contributes to an abnormally high background of up
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to 20 mSv y~l (2100 mrem y"1) . Living in a brick dwelling rather than a
wooden home can increase the annual individual dose by about 0.7 mSv
y~1. A return visit by air to the UK from Australia incurs an indi-
vidual dose of about 0.3 mSv. By comparison, the maximum individual
dose estimated for the waste repository is 0.13 mSv y~1 [KBS, 1978a];
that in the study by Hill and Lawson [1980] was 5 mSv y~1. Both of the
maximum doses would occur after about 200 000 years.
14.3 Risks from Radiation in Perspective
The risk of death from cancer from radiation averaged over age and
'sex [ICRP, 1977] is about 10~2 Sv"1 (I0~k rem"1). Exposure to a natural
radiation background of 2 mSv y~1 (200 mrem y"1) carries, therefore, a
proportionate risk of death of 2 in 100 000 per year of exposure.
A similar statistical level of risk applies to the following
societal activities in the UK [Flowers, 1976; Parker, 1978]:
smoking 30 cigarettes,
travelling 1600 km by car,
travelling 8000 km by plane,
rock climbing for 30 minutes,
canoeing for 2 hours,
engaging in ordinary factory work for 30 weeks, and
simply being male and aged 60 for 7 hours.
The upper limit of radiological dose estimated for the KBS repository
[KBS, 1978a] and by Hill and Lawson [1980] corresponded to about one-
eighth and 2.5 times the risk from these activities respectively. These
levels of individual risk must be weighed against the benefit of the 330
GWe y of electrical energy produced.
15. COST OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL
The US has published [USDOE, 1979a, 1979b, 1980] economic cost
estimates for the complete disposal scenario (e.g. vitrification, short-
term storage, long-term storage and repository costs).
These US studies assumed manufacture of glass with a high waste
loading (30 wt% calcine) and burial of waste from spent fuel 6.5 to 10
years after its discharge from the power station. These parameters
resulted in estimates of temperatures of over 350°c for the buried
glass. It is speculative whether such high temperatures are acceptable.
They do not appear realistic, at least in the near term, as some spent
fuel is likely to be 20 years old before reprocessing operations could
commence in the US. However, waste loadings of 19 and 25 wt% calcine
were achieved in the engineering scale US nuclear waste vitrification
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project on LWR fuel five and seven years after discharge [Bonner et al.,
1980].
By contrast, many European countries propose to manufacture glass
at reduced waste loadings (9 - 15 wt% calcine), and to store the glass
in near surface facilities for several decades to reduce the heat output
of the waste through fission product decay. The waste, encapsulated in
packages designed to reduce water ingress for at least 1000 years, would
finally be placed in geologic formations at spacings sufficient to
ensure that the temperature of the external surface of the glass does
not exceed 100°C.
The US data, modified to a reduced waste and thermal loading, have
been used in this study to estimate costs for the European proposals,
capital and operating costs being derived from a discounted cash flow
analysis. Comparative costs of the US and European strategy are listed
in Table 10. Details of the technical and economic ground rules used in
this assessment are given in Appendix A.
The European proposals resulted in estimates of increased costs for
the vitrification operation owing to the increased volume of waste glass
per tonne of spent fuel. A substantial cost penalty was estimated for
extended storage of glass before geologic burial. This penalty ($US29-
60/kg HM*) was based on application of US derived charges for storage
and shielding of individual waste canisters. By contrast, recent unpub-
lished French estimates for temporary storage of vitrified glass over
30-50 years were significantly lower ($14/kg HM), but involved an unspeci-
fied degree of discounting of future costs.
Greater operating charges for geologic burial were estimated for
the greater volume of waste in the European case. However, a repository
of a given size (800 ha) could accept a greater quantity of aged waste
(137 000 tonnes), where both mechanical and thermal considerations were
limiting factors. The repository capacity for fresh waste was limited
to 89 700 tonnes because of temperature restrictions in the geologic
medium.
16. CONCLUSIONS
(a) The studies and programs being coordinated by the OECD-NBA and IAEA
are making a major contribution to the development of safe and
acceptable procedures for the disposal of high-level radioactive
waste from the nuclear power industry.
* HM = heavy metal (U + Pu)
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(b) Many solid waste forms appear suitable for disposal in an appro-
priately engineered repository without presenting a significant
biological hazard.
(c) Borosilicate glass continues to be the principal radioactive waste
form selected by many nations and has been used on an industrial
scale since 1978.
(d) SYNROC is generally accepted as an improved radioactive waste form
offering greatest development potential.
(e) The technology for disposing of radioactive wastes in some geologic
formations is available.
(f) The procedures for geologic disposal require, among other things,
input from advanced hydrogeologic organisations for the development
of regional hydrogeologic models for the prediction of groundwater
movement.
(g) More assessment is required of the consequences of repository
failure during the first few hundred years after waste burial.
(h) Further study is necessary to improve confidence in the validity of
and sensitivity to parameter values in mathematical models used to
estimate radiological dose resulting from failure conditions, par-
ticularly with reference to neptunium-237.
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TABLE 1
ATTITUDES TOWARDS REPROCESSING IN COUNTRIES
WITH NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS ABOVE 30 MW
OPTIONS FOR
DISPOSAL OF
SPENT FUEL
I
GEOLOGIC BURIAL
OF UNREPROCESSED
SPENT FUEL
BEING CONSIDERED
BY:
I
REPROCESSING AND
BURIAL OF SOLIDIFIED
HIGH-LEVEL WASTE
.e.
ui
CANADA
SWEDEN
USA
1
COUNTRIES
REPROCESSING:
FRANCE
INDIA
JAPAN
UK
USSR
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
(FRG) **
COUNTRIES CONTRACTED
FOR REPROCESSING
SERVICES:
. BELGIUM
. FINLAND
. ITALY
. JAPAN
. NETHERLANDS
. SWEDEN
. SWITZERLAND
. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG)
. GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR)
UNCOMMITTED:
ARGENTINA
BULGARIA *
CZECHOSLOVAKIA *
KOREA
PAKISTAN
SPAIN
TAIWAN
* Believed to have options for reprocessing in the USSR.
** Plant understood to be under maintenance.
TABLE 2
NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR REPROCESSING SPENT FUEL FROM
COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION
COUNTRY
Belgium
REPROCESSING CAPACITY AND PLANS
The 60 t U y~ -1 Eurochemic plant at Mol was
operated between 1966 and 1974; it was then
closed as uneconomic. A decision on recom-
mencement of operations and possible increase
in capacity is awaited. Belgium has contracted
for French reprocessing of about 54 t U of
fuel.
Canada Research supporting vitrification development.
German Democratic
Republic (GDR)
Spent fuel is to be returned to the USSR for
reprocessing.
France Natural uranium gas-graphite fuel has been
reprocessed since 1958 in the 1200 t U y~1 UP1
plant at Marcoule, and also since 1967 in the
900 t U y'1 plant at Cap La Hague. The UP2
plant, after adaptation, commenced reprocessing
LWR fuel in 1976 at a nominal capacity of 100 t
U y-1 This capacity is being progressively
expanded, and new plant, UP2-800, with 800 t U
y"1 capacity is scheduled for operation by the
mid-1980s. A third plant, UP3A, of capacity 800
t U y" •*• is under construction and expected to
operate in 1985. A duplicate plant, UP3B, is
also under consideration. France has inter-
national reprocessing contracts involving a
total of about 6000 t U of LWR fuel.
Finland Spent fuel of Soviet origin is to be returned
to the USSR for reprocessing.
Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG)
The experimental 35 t U y~ * WAK plant at Karls-
ruhe, operational since 1971, was reported
closed in May 1980 for repairs to equipment.
Construction of a 350 t U y~: plant has been
proposed in Hesse State; similar plants are
under consideration for the Rhineland Pala-
tinate or Lower Saxony. A total of 1700 t U of
spent LWR fuel is contracted for reprocessing
in France.
India The 60 t U y"* Trombay plant, reprocessing
natural uranium metal fuel, became operational
in 1965. The 100 t U y~1 Tarapur plant for
reprocessing HWR and LWR fuel became opera-
tional in 1977. It is believed that a third
plant of capacity 100 t U y"l for spent oxide
fuel from heavy water reactors is intended to
be operational in the late 1980s at Kalpakkam.
TABLE 2 (Cont'd.)
COUNTRY REPROCESSING CAPACITY AND PLANS
The 1000 t U y~l B204 plant reprocessed natural
uranium gas-graphite fuel in the 1950s and
early 1960s. The 2000 t y~1 B205 plant re-
processed this fuel since 1964 and is scheduled
for a major renovation. The B204 plant, after
modification, reprocessed LWR fuels between
1968 and 1973. A 1200 t U y~ } thermal oxide
rcprc ~rsn::-j rl^ ;:t
 v'T.'."Cr^ T} u under construction
and expected to commence LWR fuel reprocessing
by 1990. The UK has international contracts for
reprocessing about 3100 t U of spent fuel.
USA The 300 t U y""1 plant at West Valley, N.Y.,
operated intermittently from 1966 to closure in
1972. A novel 300 t U y~1 plant at Morris,
Illinois was never operated owing to mainten-
ance design problems. Reprocessing of commer-
cial nuclear power fuel was deferred indefin-
itely in 1977. Construction was halted on the
1500 t U y~ L plant at Barnwell, South Carolina.
USSR No data are available on the capacities or
locations of Soviet reprocessing plants,- how-
ever it is understood that spent fuel of USSR
origin arising in COMECON countries, e.g.
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, is scheduled for
return to the Soviet Union. The USSR have also
negotiated for return of similar spent fuel
from Finland.
Italy The Eurex pilot plant at Saluggia has capacity
equivalent to about 10-20 t U y~1 of LWR fuel
and is used for reprocessing research and
development.
Japan A small 100-140 t U y~1 demonstration repro-
cessing plant at Tokai Mura has been in oper-
ation intermittently since 1977 on LWR fuel. A
commercial 1200 t U y~! plant for reprocessing
LWR fuel is planned for operation in 1990.
Japan has contracted for reprocessing 1600 t U
LWR fuel in France and 1600 t U in the UK.
Japan has also renewed a contract for repro-
cessing 500 t U of gas-graphite fuel in the UK.
Netherlands 120 t U has been contracted for reprocessing in
France.
Sweden 700 and 140 t U of LWR fuel have been contrac-
ted for reprocessing in France and the UK
respectively.
Switzerland 470 t U has been contracted for reprocessing in
France.
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TABLE 3
CANDIDATE WASTE FORM CATEGORIES
Type Waste Form
Glass
Porous glass
Phosphate glass
Borosilicate glass
High silica glass
Glass ceramics
Ceramic
Supercalcine
SYNROC
Titanates
Matrix
Metal matrixes
Multi-barrier
Cermets
TABLE 4
STATUS OF SOLIDIFICATION AND GEOLOGIC BURIAL OF HIGH-LEVEL
WASTES FROM COMMERCIAL THERMAL NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION
High-level Waste Solidification
Country
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Preferred Waste
Forms
SYNROC
Borosilicate glass
beads in lead matrix
(PAMELA Vitro-met)
Borosilicate glass
blocks (AVM) .
Borosilicate and
aluminosilicate
glasses, glass beads/
lead alloy, matrix,
crystalline ceramics,
glass-ceramics and
unreprocessed fuel.
German Democratic
Republic (GDR)
Finland
Developments
Non-radioactive large-scale production
development, together with leaching trials
at high temperatures and pressures on in-
active and irradiated specimens is being
conducted. Tests with specimens containing
fission products and actinides are planned.
Construction of a PAMELA plant at Mol to
vitrify 30 L h"1 of HLW from former
Eurochemic operation has commenced.
Negotiations are proceeding for
construction at Mol of vitrification
plant using French technology for
future reprocessing operations.
Nepheline syenite glass blocks containing
aged fission products have been subjected
to a long-term leaching trial since the
early 1960s. The Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP) , planned for operation in
1982, will be a demonstration vitrification
unit with a production capacity of 10 kg h~
of glass.
Geologic Burial
Preferred
Formations
Clay
Granite
Salt
Salt
Crystalline Rock
Development;,
An underground laboratory under
const) uctiori at Mol is planned for
operat ion in 1982 to conduct in-situ
tests in the clay deposit relevant to
geologic disposal.
Const! action of a;i underground labora-
tory c/t Whitoshell is planned to study
geolot.y, mining techniques, heat
trans: er and back filling performance.
Generj c research in the 19HOs is plan-
ned tf. be followed by a demonstration
repository i:i the 1990s, and by a
commeicial repository after 2000 for
disposal of either unreprocessed fuel
or HL'.;.
Salt comes in Jutland are under
examination. The program includes
field studies, design and safety
assessments for a repository sup-
portii g a 6000 MWe nuclear program for
30 y, with burial assumed from 2010.
A waste repository is beimj developed
at Bai tensleben.
Risk assessment studies, e -onomic
evaluations .
TABLE 4 (Cont 'd.)
High-level Waste solidification
Country
France
India
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
Spain
Preferred Waste
Forms
Borosilicate glass
Borosilicate glass
Borosilicate glass
Borosilicate glass ,
zeolite ceramics.
Borosilicate glass;
unreprocessed fuel
Borosilicate glass
Borosilicate glass
Developments
The industrial scale AVM plant at Marcoule
commenced operation in 1978. About 340
cubic metres of HLW corresponding to
reprocessing of over 6000 t of natural
uranium gas-graphite fuel were vitrified
into 150 t of glass by early 1981. A
larger plant of similar design, AVH, is
scheduled to be operational at Cap La Hague
in 1986 to solidify waste from up to 1600 t
U y~ LWR fuel , corresponding to a nuclear
generation capacity of about 50 000 MWe.
Commissioning of vitrification plant at
Tarapur commenced in late 1981 . The
plant has a capacity of about 120 kg d"1
of glass. Similar plants are planned at
Kalpakkam and at Bhabha Atomic Research
Centre.
Small scale demonstration vitrification
plants are under consideration.
Laboratory scale development is planned
by 1982 and a pilot scale vitrification
plant for operation by 1986.
Use c- the West German PAMELA process
under licence is under consideration.
Geologic Burial
Preferred
Formations
Granite
Granite
Clay,
Salt.
Granite
Salt
Granite
Granite
Salt,
Shale,
Ceramite .
Developments
It is intended to store glass blocks
for 30-50 years ii: ;iir cooled vaults.
Subsequent burial ai 1 km depth is
being considered.
Burial after 30 y of storage in an
air-cooled underground vault is
plt -med.
The sediments near the Trisaia
Centre in S. Italy are under study.
Storage of glass for up to 50 years.
Underground disposal in Japan on an
experimental basis may commence in
2015.
Inland salt domes ar»i under study;
former consideration of salt domes
under the North Sea lias been dis-
continued on grounds of cost.
A 3-year internation.il study of
geologic disposal commenced in 1981
at Stripa and is an J.n-situ experi-
ment.
Feasibility studios i or burial at
depths of up to 1500 m are in pro-
gress.
A pilot plant repository is under
consideration for the late 1980s.
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TABLE 4 (Cont'd.)
High-level Waste Solidification
Country
UK
USA
USSR
Federal
Republic of
Germany (FRG)
Preferred Waste
Forms
Borosilicate glass
Unreprocessed fuel ;
borosilicate glass,
titanate ceramics,
SYNROC, cermets,
cement, coated
particles,
super calcine,
metal matrix materials.
Aluminophosphate
glasses .
Borosilicate glass,
glass ceramics,
phosphate glasses.
Developments
The FINGAL vitrification process was
developed between 1962 and 1966. This
technology was the basis for the HARVEST
engineering scale work commenced in the
early 1970s. This national program was
abandoned in 1981. French technology will
be used for construction of an industrial
scale vitrification plant scheduled to be
operational in the late 1980s.
The waste solidification engineering
prototype plant (WSEP) had a capacity for
solidifying wastes from 1 t U d"1 of fuel.
About 50 MCi of radioactive waste was
encapsulated between 1966-1970. The Nuclear
Waste Vitrification Plant (NHVP) in 1979
vitrified high-level waste containing about:
0.4 iMCi from reprocessing 1.5 t U of LWR fuel.
260 kg of glass was produced in spray
calciner in-can melters, 20 cm diameter x
2.4 m height, which served as encapsulating
canisters for the waste.
No details available.
Geologic Burial
Preferred •
Formations
Granite
Salt,
Granite.
Salt
Salt
DeV';lopments
Some experimental drilling tests
have been conducte-1 in N. Scotland
but were discontinued in December 1981.
It is proposed to :;tore the vitrified
waste at the surface for at least 50
years.
A waste isolation j.ilot i lont (WIPP)
in New Mexico is ui.der construction in
salt for operation by late 1980s as a
test facility for 1ILW of military
origin. The Nevada terminal waste
isolation project :n granite is in-
tended as a disposal site for trans-
uranic wastes and us a test site for
temporary (5 year) geological emplace-
ment of commercial spent fuel.
Studies have been reporteJ on near-
surface storage facilities for
vitrified high-level wastes. Over
108 Ci has been reported disposed of
by injection of liquid wasto containing
about 1 Ci I"1 into deep sandstone
formations.
The disused Asse salt mine, used as a
repository for low- level radioactive
wastes since 1967 is beinq used for
in-situ testing of thermal dissipation
in salt. The salt dome at Gorleben
is currently being investigated for
possible siting of -i high-level waste
repository; a deci-jion on site suit-
ability is expected in the early 1990s.
<£>
TABLE 5
GEOLOGICAL PROCESSES THAT COULD THEORETICALLY AFFECT A WASTE REPOSITORY
Process Comment Preventive Measurc-s
Earthquake In an area of seismic instability earthquakes may occur
episodically throughout the period of desired isolation;
elsewhere there should be no short-term risk.
Avoid areas with recorded significant
seismicity, observed crustcil stress
or evidence of Holocene ear thquake
activity. Use appropriate design for
repository.
Volcanic activity In an area with evidence of recent (Holocene) volcanic
activity episodic recurrences cannot be excluded, but
other areas should be safe especially in the short term.
Avoid regions that have experienced
Holocene volcanic activity.
Erosion This may be a continuing process, the rate of which is
determined by relief and availability of erosive agents.
In a stable area of low to moderate relief, erosion
(if any) is generally at rates of millimetres to centi-
metres per thousand years. Schumm [1963] gives average
erosion rates in six US drainage basins of 3 to 7 cm y"1.
Avoid tectonically active areas and
areas of high relief; if necessary
equate depth of burial to predicted
rate of erosion.
Weathering of rock Weathering of a land surface progresses very slowly. In
a stable area the base of weathering would normally be
lowered at a rate of millimetres to centimetres per
thousand years.
Site repository beneath a mature land
surface in a tectonically stable
region.
Sea level changes These may result in either
(i) immersion of the site or reduced base level for
drainage and erosion (rise in sea level); or
(ii) accelerated erosion and lowering of base of weather-
ing (fall in sea level). Changes may result from
(a) tectonic movements (long-term except in tec-
tonically active areas); or
(b) changes in ice cap volumes (which may be
significant in the order of 103 to 101* years)
- see below.
(a) Avoid tectonically active areas.
(b) Avoid areas 0-100 m above sea
level or take special measures
to ensure that immersion or
damage to headworks of reposi-
tory would not prejudice
integrity of repository.
TABLE 5 (Cont'd.)
Process Comment Preventive Measures
Climatic change Changes in climate could include reduced or increased
precipitation or intensity of precipitation; reduced or
increased temperature or temperature range; and greater
or lesser seasonal variations. These could affect rates
of erosion and weathering. Glacial cycles take of the
order of 101* years and other significant changes of
climate would take similar periods.
Site repository beneath a mature
land surface in a tectonically stable
area and emplace waste at ,1 depth
well below credible effect; of cli-
matic change within a period of 1014
to 105 years.
Glaciation of site Substantial changes from present day ice cover would
require marked climatic change which would take thousands
of years to develop. Effects of ice advance over site
would be to raise water table level, possibly to scour
land surface with local removal of perhaps hundreds of
metres of rock, and to depress by weight of ice the land
surface.
In high latitudes or altitudes
increased depth of burial nay be
desirable. For near-sea 1'jvel sites
see 'Sea level changes' above.
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TABLE 6
GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS FOR ULTIMATE
DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTES
Type of Formation
Rock salt comprising
bedded salt and dome
salt (from diapirs)
Crystalline rock
(Granite, gneiss,
granodiorite,
gabbro, etc.)
Advantages
1. High thermal conduc-
tivity
2. Plastic condition at
low temperature and
pressure ensures
fractures are self-
sealing
3 . The existence of rock
salt indicates its
isolation from cir-
culating waters through-
out geologic times past
4, Very low permeability
1. Underground openings
are self-supporting
or require minimum
support
2. Fractured-rock per-
meability decreases
with depth, and many
such rocks have very
low permeability
3. Weathered rock ad-
jacent to fractures
has ion-exchange
properties
4. Large diameter holes
can be drilled to
great depths where
temperatures exceed
300°C
Disadvantages
1. A natural resource
commonly associated
with other resources
such as oil and gas
2. Subject to creep
under load that
accelerates with in-
crease in pressure
associated with deep
burial, and increase
in temperature asso-
ciated with heat-
generating radio-
active wastes
3. May contain up to 3%
bitterns in which the
salt is highly sol-
uble under the influ-
ence of heat
4. Bitterns that migrate
to the waste canister
walls in response to
canister heat form
pockets of highly
corrosive fluid
5. Many radioactive ele-
ments in waste will
dissolve if they come
in contact with bit-
terns
6. Poor ion-exchange
properties
1. Will be a major
source of energy in
the future , i.e.
rock with a thermal
gradient of 20 °C per
1000 m
2 . Fractures are not
self-sealing
3. Low permeability
back-fill material
required to seal
repository
4 . The larger the under-
ground opening, the
more fractures
intersected
Investigating
Countries
German
Democratic
Republic (GDR)
Netherlands
USA
Federal
Republic of
Germany (FRG)
Austria
Canada
Denmark
France
India
Japan
Sweden
Switzerland
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TABLE 6 (Cont'd.
Type of Formation Advantages Disadvantages InvestigatingCountries
Basalt
Argillaceous
formations
(1) Clay
5. Low thermal gradients
are present in some
areas (10°C per 1000
' ml
6. The regional ground-
water system can be
accurately modelled
to predict flowlines
and travel times
As for crystalline rock
above except for (2)
and (6):
2. Zones with very low
permeability do
exist, but perme-
ability does not
necessarily decrease
with depth
6. The regional ground-
water system can be
modelled, but it is
more complex owing to
variations in numbers
of fractures between
individual basalt
flows and interbed-
ded tuffs
1. Good plastic charac-
teristics and unsup-
ported openings would
be self-sealing
2. No current value as a
resource
3. Very low permeability
within the clay it-
self
4. Good ion-exchange
properties
UK*
USA
As for crystalline rock
above except for (1) ,
and the addition of
another point:
5. Because some basalts
are highly fractured
and permeable, sel-
ection of a low per-
meability thickness
of basalt will re-
quire considerably
greater effort in
proving its suitabil-
ity than would be
required for crys-
stalline rock
Subject to creep and
all openings will
require full support
and full lining
The construction of
a fully lined reposi-
tory at depths
greater than 250 m
may not be possible
or the cost may be
prohibitive
Highly permeable
sands are commonly
interbedded with
clays
Chemical reactions
take place within the
clay with increase in
temperature, and a
formation temperature
above 100°C is not
recommended
USA
Belgium
Italy
* Note: The UK recently decided [UK Hansard, 1981] to cease current geological exploration
activities in view of its intention to prolong temporary storage of high-level waste.
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TABLE 6 (Cont'd.)
Type of Formation
(2) Shale and tuff
Advantages
1. Less plastic than
clay and unsupported
openings would read-
ily deform
2. No value as a re-
source unless con-
taining hydrocarbons
3. Very low permeability
expected, but some
variation between
individual beds
4 . Good ion-exchange
5. Large diameter holes
can be drilled to
considerable depths
and kept open by the
use of dense circu-
lating muds
Disadvantages
5. Little information is
available on the mi-
gration of fluids
within the clay in
I'CSpcn^ C to <A tilOlluCix
gradient
1. All openings require
support and full lin-
ing
2. The construction of
a repository would be
possible at depths
greater than 250 m,
but deformation of
the installation
would increase with
depth
3 . Some highly permeable
beds may be part
of the sequence
4. Reaction to a thermal
gradient expected to
produce changes in
the clay minerals
and their properties
Investigating
Countries
Italy
USA
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TABLE 7
MAJOR RADIATION CONTRIBUTING TO THE MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL
RADIOLOGICAL DOSE FROM A HIGH-LEVEL WASTE REPOSITORY
[After KBS, 1978]
Maximum
_ , . , . , IndividualRadionuclide
Dose
pSv y~ i
237Np 100
99Tc 23
226Ra 23
233U 23
135(-.s g
234U 3
129I 0.6
NOT ADDITIVE
Maximum Dose at ~ 105 y pSv y~ -1
237Np 100
233U 30
226Ra 23
135CS 3
REST < 1
157
Time of
Maximum
Dose
y
10s
1 - 2 x 104
8 x 104
8 x lO4
5 x 10s
5 x 104
7 x 103 - 7 x 104
%
63
19
15
2
1
100%
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TABLE 8
PARAMETERS AFFECTING MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL ANNUAL DOSE
[After Hill and Lawson, 1980]
Reference
Parameter
Leach rate
g cm"2 d"1
(Dissolution time, y)
Groundwater velocity
m d"1
(Time per 600 m, y)
Sorption
237Np: *Kd = 102
Flow path length
km
Dispersion coefficient
m2
 -
Dose, ySv y"1
Case Variations
i n" 5 . i nr 7
3500 35C
O n m . .. . 
550
o n 7: 3 +• ~i n 2 , , . , . , ,
T
0 -\
D 000
O r
55C
1003
)0
on % at 1C)^
)
1 0.U
5000 83 90 500 1500 750
Kd = sorption coefficient
TABLE 9
ANNUAL INDIVIDUAL RADIATION DOSE TO HUMANS
Source
NATURAL
External
Cosmic rays (sea level)
Ground and building
materials
Internal
Potassium-40 in body
Water & food ingested
Air
Total, Natural
Average
Annual
Dose
mSv y~ *
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
1.2
2.1
(200 mrem y~ *)
Range
mSv y~ *
0.3 - 1.3 (2500 m)
0.2 - 20*
2.0 - 22.8
Source :
MAN-MADE RADIATION
1 Chest X-ray
1 Dental X-ray
Nuclear explosion tests
Luminous watches
Jet air travel
Sydney - Perth
Sydney - London
0.4
0.2
0.0003
0.02
0.03
0.14
0.2 - 0.7
0.02 - 0.05
0.002 - 0.03
* Thorium in beach sands, Kerala, India.
TABLE 10
COMPARATIVE COSTS OF HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL (US$ 1978)
Operation
Predisposal
Spent fuel transport &
storage
Spent fuel reprocessing
HLW solidification
Rail transport
Extended storage at
solidification plant or
geologic repository
Geologic repository
European Strategy: Glass - 10 wt% calcine * USDOE Strategy: Glas:; - 30 wt% calcine *
Capital
UO6 $)
700
91.4
127
2053
Annual
Operating
(106 $)
35-59
17.9
34.0
(27.3 y)
65.3
Economic
life
(y)
15
15
100
25
Levellised
costs
SAg HM
~60C
197-208
20. 0C
3.33C
29. 6F
60. 4C
31.95F
Capital
(106 S)
700
55
n.a.
2053
Annual
operating
(106 $)
35-59
1-7
n.a.
33.1
Economic
life
(y)
15
15
n.a.
16.4
Levellised
costs
$/kg HM
~60C
197-208C
10. <5C
3.3C
n.a.
38. 1F
n.a. - Not appropriate HM
F - Federal funding HLW
C - Commercial funding
* N.B. See full definition of European and US strategies in Appendix A.
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APPENDIX A
GROUND RULES FOR COSTING HIGH-LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL STRATEGIES
Al. STRATEGIES FOR COMPARISON
For costing purposes in this report, disposal strategies have bean
defined as follows:
'European strategy1: Spent fuel reprocessed 10 y after discharge
from che powei st.ac.ion; vicrified high-level waste t,ul,w} suoieu
for 30 y before burial in granite.
'USDOE strategy': Spent fuel reprocessed 10 y after discharge from
the power station; vitrified high-level waste buried in granite
without delay storage.
A2. ECONOMIC COMPARISON GROUND RULES
These follow the procedures adopted in Volume I of the five volume
report 'Technology for Commercial Radioactive Waste Management' [USDOE
1979]. Briefly, the ground rules are as follows: levellised unit
capital and operating costs are derived from a discounted cash flow
analysis, assuming an economic life of 15 years for plant except where
otherwise stated. The cost of money was taken to be 10 per cent from
commercial sources and 7 per cent from US federal sources, relative
prices are assumed not to change and 1976 prices were initially used but
updated to 1978 by the factor 1.17 used by USDOE. Unit capital charge
rates, i.e. the rates to xecover capital and interest, assumed a US fed-
eral tax rate of 48 per cent, state tax rate of 6.5 per cent, insurance
and property taxes of 7 per cent and a 7 per cent investment credit.
For priv-tely owned facilities, i.e. commercially funded, a bond equity
ratio of 1:3 was used and bond- and stockholders' rates of return of 8
and 12 per cent respectively. For waste solidification facilities, the
annual capacities were 1:3 and 2:3 and thereafter unity. The USDOE
report contained a median uncertainty of ± 30 per cent for capital costs
and an estimated range of +25 to -50 per cent for operating costs.
Where it is possible to defer construction and operation of any
stage in a proposed waste management scheme, this will be favoured by
the provision of a suitable fund accruing interest at available market
rates.
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A3. TECHNICAL GROUND RULES
A3.1 Scale of Operation
Estimates are based on solidifying the HLW from a 2000 t HM y"1
reprocessing plant, a storage facility of 2231 t HM y~1 for glass and a
repository of 5500 t HM y~1 for both.
The scale of operation is based on a chemical reprocessing plant
with an annual throughput of 2000 tonnes of heavy metal, i.e. uranium
and plutonium, contained in the spent reactor fuel. This assumption
allows the US cost data to be used directly rather than scaled. The
assumed throughput is also consistent with the total reprocessing capa-
city the French propose to install at Cap La Hague (1600 t U y"1) by
the mid-1980s.
A3.2 Waste Canisters and Loading
The waste canisters are assumed to be 3 m by 0.3 m diameter, the
size used by the US and Denmark. Other dimensions have been proposed,
including 1.5 m by 0.4 m diameter (Sweden); and 1 m by 0.45 m (UK);
1 m by 0.5 m diameter canisters are used to receive vitrified gas-
graphite wastes in France.
Waste loadings have been reported [Araki, 1981; Banba, 1981;
Bonniaud et al., 1980; Burton and Griffin, 1981; ELSAM and ELKRAFT,
1981; KBS, 1978; USDOE, 1979, 1980] on variable bases ranging from wt%
total calcine, wt% fission products and wt% fission products + actin-
ides. To facilitate comparison between waste loadings, volumes per
tonne of spent fuel have been derived as follows:
Waste Loading in Glass
wt% Oxides Definition of
Oxides
Denmark 9
France ~13 (est)
Japan 15-30
Sweden 9
UK 15
USA 30
probably fission
products
fission products
total calcine
fission products
fission products
+ actinides
total calcine
Waste Volume
per t Spent Fuel
m3 t'1 HM
0.10
0.10
0.15
0.10 (est)
0.06
Waste loadings assumed in this study have accordingly been 10 wt%
oxides (European strategy) and 30 wt% oxides (USDOE strategy).
A3.3 Rail Transportation
Shielded containers for high-level radioactive wastes, e.g. spent
fuel or solidified HLW, are generally designed for a particular heat
load and, within wide margins for waste configuration, the same amount
of waste can be transported.
The current design of a rail transport flask for solidified HLW has
a maximum thermal rating of 50 kW and is to be operated with an approxi-
mately 40 per cent safety margin.
For this study, the levellised transport costs have been taken as
those given in the USDOE report on technology for commercial radioactive
waste management [USDOE, 1979] .
A3.4 Storage Facility for Waste
A facility for long-term (30 y), above-ground storage of solidified
HLW would have capital costs for the provision of security and surveil-
lance, rail siding, loading and unloading systems, and so on.
The operation costs are predominantly determined by construction
costs for the concrete pads and the concrete shields that provide the
radiation shielding and the convective cooling for the solidified HLW.
These costs are related linearly to the stored quantity of waste and
relatively independent of the waste configuration (e.g. size of cylin-
der) . The facility was assumed to have an economic life of 100 y. At
each 30 year change it was assumed that one third of the concrete pads
and shields were not re-usable. The storage facility was envisaged as
being initially filled over a period of 9.1 y from an expanding nuclear
energy program at an average rate of 2231 t HM y~1 (20 300 t U). The
facility could receive, store and discharge three such batches (60 900 t
U) during its economic life.
A3.5 Waste Repository
With respect to the European (aged) and US (fresh) waste forms,
there are two major differences in the cost components for the waste
repository. Because of the lower heat generating capacity of the aged
glass waste, the repository loading for glass can be at the maximum
determined by mechanical/operational considerations. For fresh waste
the loading is restricted by its heat generation. It should be noted,
however, that this is a consequence of the assumptions utilised in the
USDOE study in which the repository was designed using conventional
underground construction.. By employing a repository consisting of a
system of deep drill-holes, in which the waste is distributed in a
three-dimensional configuration, the thermal limitations may be relaxed.
This option has been studied by Denmark.
The age of the waste at time of disposal is 40 years for European
glass (0.4 kW/canister) and 10 years for US glass (1.7 kw/canister).
The corresponding glass surface temperatures are ~85 and ~320°C above
ambient temperature respectively. The repository is 600 m below ground
surface, in granite, and has a floor area of 810 ha constructed over a
five-year period with a potential 70 per cent utilisation for high-level
waste disposal. The capacity of the repository for the European aged
glass with 10 per cent waste loading is limited by a combination of
operational and thermal considerations to 137 000 t HM whereas for the
US fresh glass with 30 per cent waste loading the limitation was 89 700
t HM because of temperature restrictions on the supporting granite
pillars within the repository. It was assumed that the waste is to be
placed in holes drilled in the floors of the emplacement rooms and the
holes lined with carbon steel pipe back-packed with crushed granite
between this pipe and the host granite and, after emplacement, plugged
at the top with concrete.
A4. APPLICATION OF GROUND RULES TO COST ESTIMATES
Cost estimates have been used on the economic ground rules and cost
data extracted from the report 'Final Environmental Impact Statement on
Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste1 [USDOE, 1980]
and its supporting document [USDOE, 1979]. These data, with minor
modifications, constitute the costing summary for the 'USDOE strategy"
detailed in Table 10. Generation of comparative data for the 'European
strategy1 required adaptation for the US material to the effect of a
reduced waste and thermal loading and the requirement for protracted
storage before geologic burial. The waste vitrification operations used
below illustrate the effect of the new ground rules.
A4.1 Comparison of Capital Costs of Vitrification
The capital costs for vitrification plants of 2000 t HM y~ * capacity
based on European and US assumptions are summarised as follows (1976 $US
x 106) :
Component
Major equipment
Buildings
Bulk materials
Site improvements
Direct construction costs
Indirect construction costs
Total field cost
Architect-engineer services
Subtotal
Owner's cost
Total facility cost
European
7.7
14.6
13.1
0.3
35.7
15.2
50.9
9.2
60.1
18.0
$78. 1M
US
4.5
9.1
7.7
0.2
21.5
9.2
30.7
5.5
36.2
10.8
$47.0M
A4.2 Comparison of Operating Costs in Vitrification
Operating costs for the European and US assumptions are as follows
(1976 $US x 106):
Component
Direct labour
Maintenance labour
Process materials
Utilities
Maintenance materials
Overheads
Miscellaneous
Annual operating cost
(rounded)
European
0.56
0.68
12.18
0.27
0.43
0.87
0.33
15.3
US
0.84
4.00
0.09
0.27
0.66
0.24
6.1
A4.3 Comparison of Unit Costs of Vitrification ($US/kg heavy metal)
Component
Capital charge
Operating charge
Unit cost (1976 US$)
Unit cost (1978 US?)
European
10.1
7.0
17.1
20.0
US
6.1
2.8
8.9
10.4
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